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THE REJECTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS IN CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATIONS:
THE NEED FOR INFORMED JUDICIAL DECISIONS
RAYMOND N. HULSERt
Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Code)' a failing busi-
ness may reorganize under the supervision of a bankruptcy court.2 Af-
ter the filing of a Chapter 11 petition, the debtor continues to operate
while a reorganization plan is developed.' The ultimate goals of reor-
ganization are to avoid liquidation, to provide fair treatment of credi-
tors' claims, and to permit the debtor to emerge from the process as a
productive business and source of employment. 4 In order to provide the
debtor with sufficient flexibility in this process, the Code permits the
rejection of burdensome executory contracts.5
Since "[h]igh priced union labor could force an otherwise finan-
cially sound company into fiscal trouble," 6 a debtor in a Chapter 11
proceeding will often be interested in rejecting its collective bargaining
agreement.7 Unilateral rejection of a collective bargaining agreement by
t B.A. 1984, Colgate University; J.D. Candidate, 1987, University of
Pennsylvania.
1 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982 & West Supp. 1986). Chapter 11 was adopted
as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151, 336 (1982 & West Supp. 1986)), which
replaced the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 55 Stat. 544 (1898) (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1200 (1976)).
2 Reorganization is seen as more efficient than permitting the liquidation of a
struggling business. "The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are
used for production in the industry for which they were designed are more valuable
than those same assets sold for scrap." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6179.
s See 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
* See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6179.
5 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). While the ability to reject
executory contracts is justifiable on a practical basis as protecting the reorganization
from being strangled by an unrealistically expensive contract, it is also justifiable as
serving the goal of fairness. It would be inequitable to allow parties to these contracts
to get full benefits while other creditors are forced to settle for a partial recovery. See
White, The Bildisco Case and the Congressional Response, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1169,
1169-1171 (1984).
6 Note, Resolving the Conflict Between the Bankruptcy and Labor Laws in Re-
jecting Collective Bargaining Agreements: NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct.
1188 (1984), 18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 191, 191 (1984) [hereinafter Resolving the
Conflict].
Organized labor has argued that debtors may view Chapter 11 proceedings as
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an employer, however, is contrary to the procedures set forth in sec-
tion 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).8 In the ab-
sence of a congressional directive on the issue of labor contract rejection
in the reorganization context, the courts have allowed rejection of labor
contracts, but have applied a stricter standard than that applied to the
rejection of ordinary commercial contracts.9 The Supreme Court gave
the final judicial response to this question in NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco.'0 Congress responded quickly to Bildisco" by passing section
1113 of the Bankruptcy Code 12 as part of the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. Congress's main objective in pass-
ing section 1113 was to give more attention to labor interests than the
Supreme Court had given'" by requiring the debtor to bargain with the
union before seeking rejection of the labor contract. 4
This Comment argues that the congressional attempt to protect the
nation's labor policy in the reorganization context is inadequate. This
inadequacy stems from the fact that the requirements of section 1113
must be interpreted and enforced solely by the presiding bankruptcy
judge, who has little or no experience in the field of labor and indus-
trial relations. The Comment suggests that protection of the national
labor policy in this area requires knowledgeable consideration of the
labor relations issues that arise when a debtor attempts to reject a labor
contract. Such consideration can be achieved through the utilization of
the expertise of labor arbitrators, mediators, or officials of the National
an easy way to shed an unfavorable labor contract. See Rosenberg, Bankruptcy and the
Collective Bargaining Agreement-A Brief Lesson in the Use of the Constitutional
System of Checks and Balances, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293, 313 (1984). Others, how-
ever, argue that the burdens and restrictions incurred in Chapter 11 proceedings will
prevent employers from using reorganization for this purpose. See, e.g., White, supra
note 5, at 1186.
1 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). The NLRA is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1982 & Supp. I 1984).
' See, e.g., Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., 519 F.2d. 698,
706 (2d Cir. 1975).
10 465 U.S. 513 (1984). The Court unanimously held that a collective bargaining
agreement could be rejected "if the debtor can show that the collective-bargaining
agreement burdens the estate, and that after careful scrutiny, the equities balance in
favor of rejecting the labor contract." Id. at 526.
"' One congressman described the House as acting with "mindboggling speed."
130 CONG. REC. H1798 (daily ed. March 21, 1984) (statement of Rep. Hyde). For a
general discussion of the legislative process behind the congressional response, see Ro-
senberg, supra note 7, at 308-21.
12 Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 541, 98 Stat. 333, 390-91 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113
(1982 & Supp. I 1984)).
See Resolving the Conflict, supra note 6, at 216.
14 See 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1984). "The legislation also embodies the
principles of the NLRA by requiring the company to bargain in good faith." 130
CONG. REC. S8900 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
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Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The success of this proposal will,
however, require the elimination of the false perception that the policies
of the bankruptcy and labor laws conflict.1 5 The elimination of this
notion, it is argued, will allow bankruptcy judges to accept and utilize
input from knowledgeable and experienced sources so that the situation
in each case may be accurately assessed, and the policies underlying
both acts may be promoted.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Chapter 11 Proceedings
Two kinds of proceedings are available to a failing business under
the Bankruptcy Code. Liquidation,"6 or straight bankruptcy, results in
dissolution of the business and distribution of its assets to creditors ac-
cording to statutorily established priorities.1" Reorganization, on the
other hand, involves an attempt to maintain the business by reassessing
and restructuring its finances."8 It is within the context of reorganiza-
tion proceedings that the issue of rejection of collective bargaining
agreements arises.
A reorganization proceeding begins with the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy court. 9 The business continues to operate, and the trustee °
or debtor in possession2 1 attempts "to reduce the business' losses, by
selling unprofitable divisions, by closing certain plants or stores, by re-
ducing the workforces, or by rejecting or renegotiating burdensome con-
tracts. '22 With the filing of the petition, creditor actions against the
debtor outside of the bankruptcy court are automatically stayed." The
15 This misperception is reflected even in the titles of scholarly commentary on the
subject. See, e.g., Note, The Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict: Rejection of a Debtor's Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement, 80 MIcH. L. REV. 134 (1981) [hereinafter The Labor-
Bankruptcy Conflict].
18 Liquidation is governed by Chapter 7 of the Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1982
& Supp. 11 1984).
'7 Priorities are established in 11 U.S.C. §§ 506-507 (1982 & Supp. I 1984).
"I Reorganization is governed by Chapter 11 of the Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-
1174 (1982 & West Supp. 1986). According to the House report: "The purpose of a
business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to restructure a business's
finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its
creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6179.
19 See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
20 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982).
21 See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1982).
22 H.R. REP No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 221, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6180-81.
23 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982 & Supp. 111984). "The stay gives the debtor the
opportunity to bring all of its creditors together for discussion, explanation of the
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automatic stay establishes the bankruptcy court as the sole forum in
which matters relating to the debtor's financial situation may be han-
dled.24 Creditors' committees are established 2 5 to consult, investigate
and participate in formulating the plan of reorganization. 2' A "disclo-
sure statement, '27 describing in detail the financial position of the busi-
ness and how that position was reached, is filed and distributed to in-
terested parties. Finally, a plan of reorganization"' is filed and
submitted to all creditors and stockholders for approval. 29 If the plan is
accepted by a majority of the creditors and stockholders and is con-
firmed by the court,30 the debts of the business are realigned and the
debtor is free from claims.31
B. Judicial Standards for Rejection of Labor Contracts
During the reorganization process the debtor is afforded the flexi-
bility necessary to effectuate a complete reorganization of its finances.
An important source of this flexibility is subsection 365(a) of the Code,
which provides that the debtor may reject burdensome executory con-
tracts.32 While the Code prohibits rejection of collective bargaining
agreements under the Railway Labor Act (RLA),33 until 1984 the
Code did not explicitly address the question of whether labor agree-
ments under the NLRA could be rejected under section 365(a). Thus,
the courts were left to decide this important issue with little or no guid-
ance from Congress.
debtor's financial problems, and negotiation. Creditors are prevented from acting uni-
laterally to gain an advantage over other creditors or to pressure the debtor into ac-
tion." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6179.
2' "The basic tenor of the new Code is to funnel all matters pertaining to the
bankruptcy case into the bankruptcy court as the forum to decide virtually all matters
touching upon any bankruptcy case." J. ANDERSON, CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATIONS
17 (1984) (footnote omitted).
28 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
26 See 11 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
27 See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
28 See 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
2 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121 (filing) & 1126 (acceptance) (1982 & Supp. I 1984).
'0 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
"' See 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1982 & Supp. I 1984).
12 Subsection 365(a) of the Code, 11 U.S.C. § 365, reads: "(a) Except as provided
in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section,
the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract
or unexpired lease of the debtor." The reasons for allowing rejection of executory con-
tracts are discussed supra note 5.
'3 The RLA is codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982). Section 1167 of the
Bankruptcy Code precludes rejection of labor contracts under the RLA. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1167 (1982).
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When the question first reached an appellate court in Shopmen's
Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products,"' the Second Circuit,
relying on the predecessor of section 365(a),35 allowed a debtor to reject
its collective bargaining agreement.3 6 The court recognized, however,
that "labor agreements are quite special ' 37 and that "[t]he decision to
allow rejection should not be based solely on whether it will improve
the financial status of the debtor."3" Thus, in recognition of the special
nature of labor contracts, the court rejected the business judgment test,
which is applied in considering the rejection of ordinary commercial
contracts.39 It stated that petitions to reject labor agreements must be
scrutinized with "particular care."40
In Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks v. REA
Express, Inc.,"1 the Second Circuit reaffirmed Kevin Steel and devel-
oped an even stricter standard for considering the rejection of collective
bargaining agreements. The court found that "[i]n view of the serious
effects which rejection has on the carrier's employees it should be au-
thorized only where it clearly appears to be the lesser of two evils and
that, unless the agreement is rejected, the carrier will collapse and the
employees will no longer have their jobs." '42 Thus, while the court rec-
ognized that rejection of labor contracts must be allowed in some cases,
the court believed that the special nature of the collective bargaining
agreement required that rejection be allowed only if the reorganization
would otherwise fail.
43
The issue finally reached the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bildisco
& Bildisco.4" In that case, the union, the NLRB, and the debtor agreed
34 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975). The court suggested that the issue had not arisen
previously because "[imn a Chapter X or XI proceeding, which is designed to preserve a
going business, only a hardy-some might say foolhardy-employer would provoke a
strike by trying to terminate an existing labor contract." 519 F.2d at 703.
"The predecessor to section 365(a) was section 313(1) of the Act of June 22,
1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, § 313(1), 52 Stat. 840, 906 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 713(1)
(1976)), which contained language identical to the currently applicable provision.
31 See 519 F.2d at 706-07.
37 Id. at 704.
a1 Id. at 707.
" This relaxed standard allows rejection in any case where it "will improve the
financial status of the debtor." Id.
40 Id. at 706.
41 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975).
42 Id. at 172.
4 The contract in question was governed by the RLA, which, like the NLRA,
allows modification of the agreement only after negotiation between management and
labor. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982). Section 1167 of the Bankruptcy Code, barring
rejection of labor agreements under the RLA, was not added until 1978. See Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 1167, 92 Stat. 2549, 2642 (codified
at 11 U.S.C. § 1167 (1982)).
44 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
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that a collective bargaining agreement was an executory contract that
could be rejected under Section 365(a) of the Code.45 Therefore, the
Court was faced with only two issues: 1) what standard should be ap-
plied by the bankruptcy court to determine whether to allow rejection;
and 2) whether the debtor is guilty of an unfair labor practice if the
agreement is modified or terminated before the bankruptcy court grants
approval.46 With regard to the first issue, the Court accepted the Kevin
Steel standard and found that a collective bargaining agreement may be
rejected if it is burdensome, and if the bankruptcy court, after "careful
scrutiny," finds that the equities balance in favor of rejection.
4
7
With regard to the second issue, the Court found, over a dissent by
four Justices, that the debtor could not be charged with unfair labor
practices by the NLRB after filing a Chapter 11 petition."' The dissent
criticized this portion of the Court's opinion as focusing solely on the
Bankruptcy Act, and, therefore failing to give sufficient weight to the
NLRA,49 which requires negotiation before a labor agreement may be
modified or terminated.50 This portion of the Court's opinion sparked
considerable criticism outside of the Court as well. For example, one
commentator claimed that the decision was a "thoughtless and insidious.
distortion of core federal labor policy." ' 1 Moreover, it is apparent that
this portion of the decision was a major impetus in Congress's passage
of section 1113 of the Code. The new provision expressly prohibits uni-
lateral termination of the labor agreement absent prior court
approval.52
" See id. at 521-22.
4 See id. at 516.
47 See id. at 526.
48 See id. at 527-34. The Court noted:
Though the Board's action is nominally one to enforce §8(d) of [the
NLRA], the practical effect of the enforcement action would be to require
adherence to the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement. But the fil-
ing of the petition in bankruptcy means that the collective-bargaining
agreement is no longer immediately enforceable, and may never be en-
forceable again.
Id. at 532.
49 See id. at 540-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" See section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1982).
51 Gregory, Labor Contract Rejection in Bankruptcy: The Supreme Court's At-
tack on Labor in NLRB v. Bildisco, 25 B.C.L. REv. 539, 606 (1984).
62 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(0 (Supp. 11 1984). However, section 1113(d)(2) does
provide that if the court does not rule on the application within 30 days after the
commencement of the hearing, or within such additional time as agreed upon by the
debtor and the representative of the employees, the debtor may terminate or alter any
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement pending the ruling of the court on the
application for rejection. It should also be noted that the provision provides for immedi-
ate, interim changes by the debtor in circumstances where the business would otherwise
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C. The Statutory Approach: Section 1113
On February 22, 1984, the day the Supreme Court handed down
the Bildisco decision, Congressman Peter Rodino introduced a bill in
the House of Representatives which would have overturned both ele-
ments of the Supreme Court's decision. 53 The bill prohibited unilateral
action by the employer prior to court approval and adopted the stricter
REA Express standard for rejection of labor contracts.54 Another bill
similarly incorporating the REA Express standard55 and disallowing
termination prior to court approval was introduced in the House of
Representatives on March 19, 1984.56 That bill, H.R. 5174, contained
a provision requiring that the debtor and union exchange proposals and
that they meet and confer in good faith prior to rejection. 57 It was sent
to the floor of the House under a procedure limiting amendment and
debate, and was passed on March 21, 1984,58 less than one month after
the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Bildisco.59
Members of the Senate objected to the speed with which the
collapse. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e) (Supp. 11 1984). "[T]he standard for qualifying for
interim relief is, in essence, the REA Express standard." 130 CONG. REc. S8899 (daily
ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Reps. Hughes and Morrison).
5' See H.R. 4908, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. H809 (daily ed. Febru-
ary 22, 1984). The concern with the rejection of labor contracts in reorganization came
to Congress in the fall of 1983, when unions testified that employers were using bank-
ruptcy as a weapon against them and as a method of freeing themselves from an unfa-
vorable agreement. See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 312. Thus, Bildisco was not the
impetus for the initial consideration of the issue, but rather, the occasion for the intro-
duction of Rodino's bill. For a complete discussion of the legislative history of § 1113,
see Rosenberg, supra note 7; Note, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in
the Aftermath of 11 U.S.C. Section 1113: What Does Congress Intend?, 9 DEL. J.
CORP. LAw 701 (1984). The legislative process leading to the passage of § 1113 em-
phasizes Congress's apparent haste.
5 See H.R. 4908, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H809 (daily ed. Feb. 22,
1984).
" See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
5' See H.R. 4908, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. H1727 (daily ed. Feb.
22, 1984).
11 See id.
" See H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. H1795-1854 (daily ed.
Mar. 21, 1984).
"' The speed of the House response cannot be attributed entirely to strong reac-
tions to Bildisco. Rather, Congress nceded to adopt bankruptcy reform legislation
before the expiration of the emergency rules that the bankruptcy courts had been oper-
ating under since Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982). In Marathon Pipeline, the Supreme Court found the appointment of bank-
ruptcy judges with lifetime tenure under the 1978 Bankruptcy Act unconstitutional.
Thus, section 1113 was simply one provision of a major bankruptcy law revision, the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 361 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151, 302 (Supp. 11 1984)) which Congress
needed to pass quickly.
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House of Representatives had acted,6 0 and to the adoption of a standard
that would cause the collapse of a debtor before the labor contract could
be rejected.61 The Senate was, however, unable to agree on any labor
provision and ultimately passed a bill without such a provision, leaving
it to the conference committee to carve out a system for dealing with the
rejection of collective bargaining agreements.62 Finally, at 3:00 A.M. on
June 28, 1984, three hours after the rules under which the bankruptcy
courts had been operating expired, the conferees reached an agree-
ment.63 The provision agreed upon by the conference committee was
signed into law on July 10, 1984 as section 1113 of the amended Bank-
ruptcy Code. 4
Under the bankruptcy amendments, rejection of labor contracts is
governed exclusively by section 1113." That provision requires the
debtor, prior to filing a request for rejection of the collective bargaining
agreement, to make a proposal to the union that provides only for those
modifications of the agreement that are necessary to the reorganiza-
tion.66 The proposal must treat all affected parties "fairly and equita-
bly."" The debtor should also provide the union with the information
necessary to evaluate its proposal.68 Between the date of the proposal
and the date on which hearings on the issue begin, the debtor is obli-
gated to meet with the employees' representatives and "confer in good
faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications."6 The
court should hold hearings within fourteen days of the filing of the
debtor's request for permission to reject the labor agreement.70 Rejec-
tion is allowed only if the court finds that the debtor has met the obli-
gations just described, that the union has rejected the debtor's proposal
for modification "without good cause," and that "the balance of the
60 See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. S6083 (daily ed. May 21, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Thurmond) ("Numerous Members of the House ... pointed out the danger in moving
so quickly on legislation to overturn a unanimous Supreme Court Decision without
hearings or careful study. I share that concern . . ").
0" Senator Hatch noted: "[T]he House bill seems to promise only lost jobs and
benefits. It may preserve a piece of paper called the labor contract, but contracts with a
liquidated company offer hollow promises." 130 CONG. REC. S6091 (daily ed. May 21,
1984).
62 See 130 CONG. REc. S7617 (daily ed. June 19, 1984).
63 See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 318-19.
See id. at 321.
65 Under 11 U.S.C. §1113(a) (Supp. 11 1984), the debtor may reject a collective
bargaining agreement "only in accordance with the provisions of this section."
66 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 11 1984).
67 Id.
68 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 11 1984).
69 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1984).
70 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
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equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement."7' 1 Section 1113 also
makes it clear that the debtor may not unilaterally terminate the agree-
ment prior to receiving court approval."2
Congress thus rejected the position taken by the Supreme Court in
Bildisco and established a set of procedural requirements that a bank-
ruptcy court must follow before it may allow rejection. The inclusion of
these requirements, particularly the duty to confer in good faith after
the proposal is made, represents an attempt by Congress to promote the
national labor policy in favor of collective bargaining.7" Prior to the
passage of section 1113, commentators had suggested that a duty to
bargain was the appropriate manner of safeguarding the rights of em-
ployees and the policies of the NLRA.74 Congress's actions have been
applauded as moving away from the Court's approach, which focused
solely on the bankruptcy law. 5 The next section of this Comment ar-
gues that it is questionable whether section 1113 will actually achieve
the goal of better protecting national labor policies.
II. THE CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE DIFFERENTIAL
TREATMENT FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
Through section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress sought to
protect national labor policies by providing treatment of collective bar-
gaining agreements that differs from the treatment afforded other com-
mercial contracts. 6 Congress set down a list of procedural requirements
to be followed before rejection of a labor contract could be allowed. The
shortcoming of this effort to protect labor policies lies in the fact that
the bankruptcy courts are the sole forum in which these requirements
are to be interpreted and enforced.77 Bankruptcy judges have the exper-
71 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(1)-(3) (Supp. 11 1984).
72 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
7 Senator Packwood stated that "[t]his provision encourages the collective bar-
gaining process, so basic to federal labor policy." 130 CONG. REC. S8898 (daily ed.
June 29, 1984). Similarly, Senator Moynihan commented: "[T]his provision, then, em-
bodies the basic principles of collective bargaining established by Congress in the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act." 130 CONG. REc. S8900 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
74 See, e.g., The Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict, supra note 15, at 152.
71 See, e.g., Resolving the Conflict, supra note 6, at 216 ("Instead of focusing
almost exclusively on the bankruptcy laws, as the Court did, Congress also looks to the
labor laws, and the NLRA's requirements of good faith negotiation.").
71 Collective bargaining agreements were technically removed from the ordinary
coverage of section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code by § 541 of the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 361, 367
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (Supp. 11 1984)). Collective bargaining agreements are
then placed strictly under the governance of § 1113. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (Supp. II
1984).
77 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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tise to resolve most reorganization problems, but that expertise does not
necessarily extend to the specialized area of labor relations."
A. Labor Relations: A Specialized Area
The area of labor relations has long been viewed as a specialized
one by both the courts and Congress. This recognition of the special
nature of labor relations and collective bargaining agreements is at the
heart of the stated policy of the Supreme Court to defer to the NLRB
in matters involving this specialized field.79 The Supreme Court articu-
lated that policy most clearly in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,80
which referred to the NLRB as "presumably equipped or informed by
experience to deal with a specialized field of knowledge, whose findings
within that field carry the authority of an expertness which courts do
not possess and therefore must respect."'" The Supreme Court made
similar observations in the Steelworkers Trilogy, 2 expressing a policy
that favors grievance arbitration. According to the Court, "special heed
should be given to the context in which collective bargaining agree-
ments are negotiated and the purposes which they are intended to
7 The fact that bankruptcy judges do not have experience outside of the bank-
ruptcy field was, in fact, praised as one reason why the bankruptcy system works:
"[T]he reason that the bankruptcy court system works as well as it does today is be-
cause the trial judges are specialists, experienced in handling the problems that arise.
They are experienced because they handle exclusively bankruptcy cases." H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5963, 5981 (emphasis added). The specialization of the bankruptcy courts becomes a
problem, however, when those courts must make determinations in another specialized
field, such as labor law, "because the bankruptcy court, which must apply the test, will
rarely possess expertise on problems peculiar to labor." Note, Kevin Steel and REA
Express Revisited: When is a Collective Bargaining Agreement Burdensome?-In Re
Bildisco, 56 TEMPLE L.Q. 252, 277-78 (1983) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Kevin
Steel and REA Express Revisited].
11 For a general discussion of judicial review of the NLRB, see R. GORMAN,
BAsic TEXT ON LABOR LAW 10-14 (1976).
so 340 U.S. 474 (1950).
81 Id. at 488. See also NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, 357 U.S. 357,
362-63 (1958) ("[T]he [NLRA] [imposed responsibilities] primarily on the Board to
appraise carefully the interests of both sides of any labor-management controversy in
the diverse circumstances of particular cases and in the light of the Board's special
understanding of these industrial situations."); NLRB v. Erie Register Corp., 373 U.S.
221, 236 (1963) ("[W]e must recognize the Board's special function of applying the
general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life . . ").
1- The Steelworkers Trilogy is a collection of three Supreme Court decisions de-
cided on the same day containing a strong statement favoring arbitration of grievances
under a labor contract. The cases are: United Steelworkers of America v. American
Mfg., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation, 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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serve.""3 And finally, the Court made it clear that, in comparison with
arbitrators, "[t]he ablest of judges cannot be expected to bring the same
experience and competence to bear . ..because he cannot be similarly
informed."84
Congress's awareness that labor relations is a specialized field in
which expertise can be developed is apparent in the passage of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Through the NLRA, Congress
established a separate statutory and administrative scheme to govern
labor relations. The fact that this scheme still operates fifty years after
its creation is evidence that Congress continues to view industrial rela-
tions as a specialized field, and that it continues to respect the expertise
of those who enforce the NLRA's provisions.
Because they have recognized that labor relations is a specialized
area, the courts and the legislature have had little doubt that collective
bargaining agreements required special treatment in the reorganization
context. In Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel,85 the Second Circuit
recognized "that labor agreements are quite special.""8 Given that pre-
mise, the court concluded that "bankruptcy courts must scrutinize with
particular care petitions to reject collective bargaining agreements."8
In Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks v. REA Ex-
press, Inc.88 the court applied a still stricter standard89 because "of the
serious effects which rejection has on the carrier's employees."'90 The
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco adopted a different
standard 9 but also accepted the premise that labor contracts are differ-
ent, and stated, "We agree with these Courts of Appeals that because
of the special nature of a collective-bargaining contract, and the con-
sequent 'law of the shop' which it creates ... a somewhat stricter
standard should govern." '92 Thus, courts have not questioned the notion
that collective bargaining agreements are different and that they re-
quire special treatment.
Perhaps an even clearer expression of the belief that collective bar-
83 American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 567.
84 Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582.
85 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
88 Id. at 704 (emphasis added).
87 Id. at 706. See also supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (discussing the
heightened standard applied to collective bargaining agreements by the Second Circuit).
88 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975).
8 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
90 523 F.2d at 172.
91 465 U.S. 513 (1984). For the argument that the standard applied to collective
bargaining agreements in this context is irrelevant, see White, supra note 5, at 1181-
83.
92 465 U.S. 513, 524 (1984) (emphasis added).
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gaining agreements require special treatment was Congress's removal
of such agreements from section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, and
the attendant development of an entirely separate scheme for dealing
with labor contract rejection.93 Congress determined that the particular
nature of collective bargaining agreements mandated more protection
than simply the application of a standard stricter than that applied to
ordinary commercial contracts.94 Congress thus began its consideration
of the issue with the assumption, shared by the courts, that labor agree-
ments require special treatment.
The reason that the courts and Congress readily agreed on this
point is that collective bargaining agreements are indeed very different
from ordinary commercial contracts. Labor contracts are not different
simply because they are collectively bargained; rather, they differ in
almost all respects from other commercial contracts because of the par-
ticular nature of the relationship that gives rise to them. They are
blueprints for industrial self-governance, reconciling the competing in-
terests of a number of constituencies into documents that articulate the
rights and obligations of workers and management. When a debtor re-
jects a bargaining agreement, it rejects more than a "deal"-it rejects a
carefully negotiated instrument that plays an essential role in imple-
menting a national labor policy favoring peaceful resolution of work-
place disputes.95
93 One representative commented on the general consensus that labor contracts
could be rejected in Chapter 11 as follows: "[Tihis decision does not mean that a debtor
may treat a collective bargaining contract as simply any other contract for goods or
services." 130 CONG REc. H1798 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984) (statement of Rep. Hall).
Congress's belief that application of a strict standard was insufficient is sup-
ported by evidence. It has been noted that in at least half of those cases applying the
REA Express standard, the most stringent test articulated by the courts, the test was
passed and the contract rejected. See Kevin Steel and REA Express Revisited, supra
note 78, at 274.
" The Supreme Court has recognized this important distinction between labor
agreements and ordinary commercial contracts, and the important role labor agree-
ments play in plant governance. As the Warrior & Gulf majority noted:
A collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of indus-
trial self-government. When most parties enter into contractual relation-
ship they do so voluntarily, in the sense that there is no real compulsion to
deal with one another, as opposed to dealing with other parties. This is
not true of the labor agreement. The choice is generally not between en-
tering or refusing to enter a relationship, for that in all probability preex-
ists the negotiations. Rather it is between having that relationship gov-
erned by an agreed-upon rule of law or leaving each and every matter
subject to a temporary resolution dependant solely upon the relative
strength, at any given moment, of the contending forces.
Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 574. Professor Gorman has analogized labor agreements
to statutes, because they articulate "a host of rules and regulations for carrying on the
day-to-day activities of [union] employees," and because they are negotiated by a union
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B. Keeping Labor Law out of the Bankruptcy Courts
Given the peculiar nature of collective bargaining agreements and
the relationship from which they arise, both the Supreme Court and
Congress were understandably concerned about requiring bankruptcy
judges to make determinations in areas in which those judges lack the
necessary expertise. The Court alluded to this concern in Bildisco, not-
ing that a bankruptcy court "need not determine that the parties have
bargained to impasse or make any other determination outside the field
of its expertise."9 The congressional debates over section 1113 and its
predecessor bills echo this concern. Senator Dole, for example, criti-
cized an early proposal by Senator Packwood that the parties be re-
quired to bargain to impasse before rejection, which he felt "would ef-
fectively convert the bankruptcy courts into labor relations boards, with
resulting damage not only to the collective bargaining process but also
to the efficiency of the bankruptcy courts."9 Both the Court and the
legislature were thus aware of the problem of requiring bankruptcy
judges to deal with questions requiring a knowledge of the industrial
setting in which such issues arise.
Congress attempted to address this concern about extending bank-
ruptcy courts beyond their area of competence by providing that the
bankruptcy judges were not to follow established labor law precedent in
enforcing section 1113. Senator Thurmond commented that the re-
quirement that a union have good cause98 for rejecting a proposal "is
obviously not intended to import traditional labor law concepts into a
bankruptcy forum or turn the bankruptcy courts into a version of the
National Labor Relations Board." 99 Congress made it clear that the
bankruptcy courts were not as able to deal properly with labor issues as
was the NLRB, and that therefore, those courts should not attempt to
do so.
Congress was appropriately concerned about bringing the un-
wieldy apparatus of established labor law precedent into the bank-
that speaks for "an amalgam of workers who are skilled and unskilled, young and old,
male and female, black and white, educated and uneducated, whose ambitions, needs
and interests frequently come into conflict." R. GORMAN, supra note 79, at 540-541.
"6 Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 526-27.
17 130 CONG. REC. S6187 (daily ed. May 22, 1984) (statement of Sen. Dole).
98 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(2) (Supp. I 1984).
91 130 CONG. REc. S8888 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Thur-
mond). See also 130 CONG. REc. S6194 (daily ed. May 22, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Thurmond) (The fact that the "good faith" language of § 1113 is drawn from the
NLRA "may result in the establishment, in the bankruptcy context, of cumbersome
and rigid procedures modeled after those contained in the labor law, We should not
risk imparting such procedures into the bankruptcy context.").
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ruptcy courts,100 but its attempt to protect national labor policy through
section 1113 is inadequate. Preventing the use of labor law precedent
does not alter the fact that any determination of whether the require-
ments of section 1113 are met, and thus, whether a labor contract may
be rejected, requires an assessment of the labor relations setting in
which the bargaining occurs. The provision contains requirements that
necessitate an evaluation of the validity and importance of the concerns
of organized labor and of the actions of both the union and the debtor
in their bargaining efforts. Congress, therefore, barred labor law prece-
dent from the courts, but it did not remove the issue of labor contract
rejection from the labor relations setting. Bankruptcy judges, who are
solely responsible for the application of 1113, must be familar with that
setting if section 1113 is to protect labor interests adequately.
Section 1113's failure to compensate for the inexperience of bank-
ruptcy judges in the labor relations setting is compounded by the fact
that Congress was unclear about the very policies the provision was
supposed to protect. Congress, through section 1113, provides a list of
procedural requirements to be followed before a bankruptcy court may
allow rejection, including the requirements that the debtor bargain in
good faith,101 that the union not reject the debtor's proposal for change
without good cause,'0 2 and that the debtor's proposal provide only for
those modifications of the agreement that are necessary to the reorgani-
zation. 03 The legislature acted with such haste in passing section
1113,04 however, that the legislative history is conspicuously sparse.
There are no legislative reports to accompany the section, 0 5 and only
vague and confusing admonitions in the Congressional Record. Senator
Thurmond, for example, stated that "the intent is for these provisions
to be interpreted in a workable manner,"' 0 6 but the record as a whole
provides no guidance on what a "workable manner" might be. Instead,
one finds a rather circular approach, in which the "good cause" re-
quirement is used to help define the "good faith requirement." As Sen-
ator Packwood explained, "The 'without good cause' language provides
100 See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
101 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2) (Supp. H 1984).
102 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(2) (Supp. 111 984).
103 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (Supp. H 1984).
104 See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
105 See 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 576; S. BERNSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY
PRACTICE AFTER THE AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1984, at 121 (1984) (The June 29, 1984
Congressional Record "is the only public source for determining congressional intent
on the final draft of the subtitle-there are no committee prints or legislative debate.").
106 130 CONG. REc. S8888 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Thurmond).
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an incentive or pressure on the debtor to negotiate in good faith."107
Largely as a result of this confusing congressional guidance,1"8 the
bankruptcy courts have in practice collapsed the good faith bargaining
and good cause for refusal elements of section 1113 into a focus on the
"necessity" of the proposed modifications.' 9 The courts may have seen
this focus on necessity as a means of avoiding the consideration of fac-
tors that require a knowledge of the labor relations setting. Such a
view, however, would rely upon the false perception that a determina-
tion of the necessity of a particular modification can be removed from
its labor relations setting, and thus, that a decisionmaker would not be
hindered by her lack of familiarity with that setting. This approach
mistakenly assumes that a determination of whether a proposal is nec-
essary is a straightforward process with only one possible outcome. Al-
though it may be clear in a given situation that the debtor must cut
costs by a precisely defined amount, it may also be true that the union
has a legitimate reason for objecting to the manner of distributing and
structuring the cost-cutting that is called for by the debtor's proposal.110
In such a situation the court, in determining whether "good cause" for
refusal in fact exists, cannot and should not avoid a searching examina-
tion of the merits of the union's objections to the debtor's proposal.
One case illustrates what can happen when a bankruptcy judge
gives uninformed consideration to a union's objections to a debtor's pro-
posal for rejecting a bargaining agreement. In In Re Allied Delivery
System Co.,"' the debtor's reorganization proposal imposed a higher
salary cut on union employees than it did on nonunion employees. The
107 130 CONG. REC. S8898 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Packwood). See also 130 CONG. REC. H7496 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement on
H.R. 5174 by Reps. Hughes and Morrison) ("The phrase 'without good cause' . . . is
intended to ensure that a continuing process of good faith negotiations will take place
before court involvement . . ").
108 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
109 See In Re Allied Delivery System Co., 49 Bankr. 700, 704 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1985) (finding that if the proposal contains only fair, equitable, and necessary modifi-
cations, the union cannot have good cause for refusal); In re K & B Mounting, Inc., 50
Bankr. 460, 465 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985) ("[A] debtor negotiates in good faith. . . by
offering only necessary modifications which affect all parties equally.").
110 It should be noted that the union stands to lose a great deal if it rejects a
proposal which is, in fact, necessary to the survival of the business. Some commentators
suggest that the union's view of necessity should be given considerable weight because
the union has very strong reasons for making an accurate assessment. See Bordewieck
& Countryman, The Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11
Debtors, 57 AM. BANKR. L. J. 299, 319 (1983); cf. Gregory, Legal Developments Since
NLRB v. Bildisco: Partial Resolution of Problems Surrounding Labor Contract Re-
jection in Bankruptcy, 62 DEN. U.L. REv. 615, 623-24 & n.59 (1985) [hereinafter
Legal Developments] (unions have made concessions to many truly financially dis-
tressed employers).
11 49 Bankr. 700 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
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court did not overlook the union's "understandable" concern that non-
union employees were less affected by the proposal than union employ-
ees," 2 but did not find this concern significant enough to warrant rejec-
tion of the proposal."' The debtor's favorable treatment of less
expensive nonunion labor"14 during a time of fiscal crisis raised serious
questions about the employer's commitment to an effective union pres-
ence in its plant, but the court dismissed this concern by stating that
fair and equitable treatment under 1113 does not necessarily mean
"equal" treatment." 5 Such a finding inherently involves a weighing of
the union's concerns-a weighing that the bankruptcy court is not
equipped to perform." x6
The courts are also called upon to make determinations beyond
the scope of their expertise in evaluating whether the bargaining efforts
of the two parties meet the good faith standard set forth in section
1113. Clearly the bankruptcy judge is capable of determining that a
proposal was put forth and that meetings were held, but this limits the
analysis to the form rather than the substance of bargaining. Any claim
of bad faith will require the bankruptcy court to estimate the reasona-
bleness of the parties' positions regarding certain terms of the agree-
112 See id. at 702-704.
113 See id. at 704; see also In Re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 Bankr. 835, 840-41
(Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985). The court recognized that "the Union may often have a prin-
cipled reason for deciding to reject the debtor's proposal and which may, when viewed
subjectively and from the standpoint of its self-interest, be a perfectly good reason." Id.
at 840. The court found, however, that the union's policy determination that it could
not negotiate away pension benefits or its affiliation with the National Master Freight
Agreement, although not an unreasonable basis for rejection, did not constitute "good
cause." See id. at 840-41. The court's recognition of the fact that a union may have
"principled reasons" for rejection suggests that courts will be called upon to evaluate
those "principled reasons." Adequate evaluation by the bankruptcy judges will require
a familiarity with the industrial relations setting in which the issue arises.
114 See In Re Allied Delivery, 49 Bankr. at 702-03.
115 See id. at 703.
"' An interesting question arises when the union offers a counter-proposal which
also provides for the "necessary" changes. As one commentator suggests:
Assume that a union is too sophisticated to flatly reject a proposal that
meets the "necessary" and "fair and equitable" requirements of section
11 13(b)(2). Assume that it instead makes a counter-proposal which, while
offensive to management and favorable to the union, contains only modifi-
cations "necessary" to the reorganization and "fair and equitable" to all
parties. Is it "good cause" to reject the debtor's proposal that the the
union's counter-proposal is equally acceptable under section 1113(b)(2)?
Gibson, The New Law on Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Chapter
11: An Analysis of 11 U.S.C. § 1113, 58 AM. BANKR. L. J. 325, 341 (1985). Gibson
goes on to say that "It]he legislative history provides no clear answer to this question,
and it will have to await resolution in the courts." Id. Resolution by the bankruptcy
courts requires that those courts understand and appreciate the unique characteristics
of the employer/employee relationship and the labor relations setting.
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ment, though it has little knowledge of the significance of those terms to
the parties.
The inability of a bankruptcy court to come to a clearly reasoned
decision in the face of its lack of labor experience is revealed by the
statement of the bankruptcy judge in In Re American Provision Co.:
l"7
"[F]rankly, I am left with the impression that the debtor's attempts to
confer were perfunctory only . . .. ""' A decision that will bind the
debtor and an entire union for the term of the contract should not be
based upon a bankruptcy judge's uninformed "impressions." Rather,
the judges must receive assistance in making determinations that will
unavoidably arise, and that will necessarily involve matters peculiar to
the labor setting.
It is possible that Congress, given its haste to pass bankruptcy re-
form legislation 19 and its interest in placating the concerns of organ-
ized labor, 20 believed that the bargaining requirements of section 1113
would be self-enforcing. There is, in fact, evidence that members of
Congress saw the bargaining requirement as removing the issue of con-
tract rejection from the bankruptcy court and placing it on the bargain-
ing table.121 This view, however, fails to account for the necessity of
enforcing the bargaining requirements themselves.' 22 A debtor will
117 44 Bankr. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
118 Id. at 911 (emphasis added).
119 See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
121 See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 313.
121 See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC S8898 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Packwood) (The good faith bargaining requirement "places the primary focus on the
private collective-bargaining process and not in the courts." The Senator also expressed
his belief that "the bill should stimulate collective bargaining and limit the number of
cases when a judge will have to authorize the rejection of a labor contract.").
122 The fact that bargaining requirements need enforcement and that such en-
forcement must be carried out by officials with knowledge in the field of labor relations
is revealed through an examination of the history of the NLRA's good faith bargaining
requirement. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). In determining whether the requirements
of that section have been met, the physical aspects of bargaining are easily monitored:
one need only find that the parties have met and conferred. However, to hold the par-
ties only to a requirement of meeting would allow them to go through the superficial
motions of bargaining with no real effort to reach an agreement. As Professor Cox has
noted: "The concept of 'good faith' was brought into the law of collective bargaining as
a solution to this problem." Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 1401, 1413 (1958).
The early decisions of the NLRB found that good faith required "a sincere desire
to reach an agreement." Fleming, The Obligation to Bargain in Good Faith, 47 VA. L.
REV. 988, 991 (1961). It was quickly discovered, however, that the state of mind could
only be evaluated by looking at the bargainers' conduct. See id.; see also R. GORMAN,
supra note 79, at 482. Ultimately, the bargainers' conduct could only be evaluated by
looking to the terms of the proposals and the reasonableness of the parties' positions.
See Gross, Cullen & Hanslowe, Good Faith in Labor Negotiations: Tests and Reme-
dies, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1020 (1968).
Although the bargaining requirement of section 1113 was not intended to carry
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have little reason to bargain with a sincere interest in compromising if,
following an abbreviated bargaining session,123 a bankruptcy judge will
be the only official evaluating the debtor's bargaining efforts, and if
that same judge will determine whether the contract should be
rejected. 24
Bargaining requirements need enforcement. They will not be en-
forced effectively, however, unless the court responsible for policing the
reorganization process has the ability to evaluate the substance of the
parties' proposals in an informed fashion. Since bankruptcy courts do
not possess this ability, bankruptcy judges should be required to obtain
knowledgeable assistance and input in making those determinations
specifically involving labor relations. The purposes of the bankruptcy
and labor laws can be effectuated fully only if the factors involved are
intelligently considered.
III. KNOWLEDGEABLE INPUT: A PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. A Misperceived Obstacle
The success of any attempt to provide knowledgeable input into
the section 1113 decision-making process requires eliminating the per-
ception that the issue of labor contract rejection in Chapter 11 reorgan-
ization involves a fundamental conflict between the policies of the
Bankruptcy Code and those of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). Evidence of this perception is found in the literature as well
as the Congressional Record. One commentator has suggested that the
proper solution should involve establishing a "sound balance between
the competing policies,"'25 while another found that "the Bankruptcy
labor law doctrines with it, certainly the experience under the NLRA is instructive as
to the operation of bargaining requirements generally. That experience makes it clear
that bargaining requirements need enforcement, and that enforcement requires an abil-
ity to evaluate the substance of the parties' proposals in an informed fashion. Without
knowledge of the industry involved, bankruptcy judges cannot effectively evaluate the
reasonableness of the industrial bargaining positions.
123 Under the terms of section 1113, the bargaining period may be as brief as 15
days. Section 1113(b)(2) requires good faith bargaining between the date when the
debtor makes a proposal to the union, and the date when hearings begin. Hearings are
to begin, according to section 1113(d)(1), no later than 14 days after an application for
rejection is filed. Under section 1113(b)(1)(A), it is possible for the debtor to file such
an application the day immediately following the date on which a proposal is given to
the union. Thus the period between making a proposal to the union and the start of
hearings may be as little as 15 days. As one bankruptcy judge noted: "[Tihe time frame
for considering the debtors proposal is intentionally very severe." S. BERNSTEIN, Supra
note 105, at 127.
124 Under section 1113(d)(2) the bankruptcy judge must rule on the application
for rejection within 30 days after the start of the hearings.
12 The Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict, supra note 15, at 148-52 (emphasis added).
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Code is in fundamental conflict with the federal labor policies enunci-
ated in the National Labor Relations Act."1 1 26 Members of Congress
revealed their perception that the policies conflict during consideration
of the issue in floor debate. One Senator stated that "we now confront a
basic conflict between the two valid national policies,"1  while another
Senator believed that the issue involved "two very divergent
policies.
'128
The perception of conflict results from an inaccurate view of the
policies underlying Chapter 11 of the Code and the NLRA. Reorgani-
zation is not allowed under Chapter 11 to benefit only the debtor's
business, and collective bargaining is not promoted blindly by the
NLRA to the extent that one must bargain when liquidation will re-
sult. Rather, the underlying policy goal of both acts is the stability and
continuity of industry, largely as a source of employment. The report
accompanying the 1978 Bankruptcy Act states, "The purpose of a busi-
ness reorganization case . . . is to restructure a business's finances so
that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its
creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. 129 This process
was promoted because Congress believed that "[it is more economically
efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and
assets."130 This policy clearly overlaps with that stated in section 1 of
the NLRA: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States
to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free
flow of commerce." ' Bankruptcy policy attempts to promote con-
tinuity in employment and the use of assets, while in labor, as the Su-
preme Court noted, "The present federal policy is to promote industrial
stabilization." ' 2 When the fundamental goals of the two acts are con-
sidered, there is little reason to believe that they clash in the context of
labor contract rejection during reorganization. 3 '
Interestingly, the proposed solution referred to was the imposition of a bargaining re-
quirement before rejection could be approved by the bankruptcy court. The article was
written in 1981-1982, indicating that Congress was certainly not the first to suggest
this solution.
12' Gregory, supra note 51, at 540 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
127 130 CONG. REc. S6198 (daily ed. May 22, 1984) (statement of Sen. Mitchell)
(emphasis added).
128 130 CONG. REc. S6192 (daily ed. May 22, 1984) (statement of Sen. DeCon-
cini) (emphasis added).
" ' H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6179 (emphasis added).
'30 Id. (emphasis added).
a11 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
112 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960)
(footnote omitted).
'33 A narrowing of the conceptual gap between the policies of the two Acts is
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The policies of Chapter 11 do not necessitate an absolute prefer-
ence for the employer's or debtor's interest, and the policies of the
NLRA do not require bargaining at all costs. The policies of both acts
do, however, require an informed consideration of the needs of parties
in an employer-employee relationship as well as a creditor-debtor rela-
tionship. Thus, the solution to the issue of labor contract rejection does
not require an infusion of labor law into the bankruptcy courts, but
simply the assurance that the analysis by the bankruptcy court ade-
quately and intelligently takes into consideration all of the relevant
facts that the issue raises.
B. Sources of Input
If providing knowledgeable input for bankruptcy judges is to be a
solution to the difficulty with the application of section 1113, it is nec-
essary to identify appropriate sources of that input. Fortunately, in the
context of collective bargaining and industrial relations this is not a
difficult task. Various groups have developed expertise in the industrial
relations area through years of experience with employers, unions, col-
lective bargaining agreements, and the NLRA. Specifically, Congress
and the courts have labelled labor arbitrators, mediators, and NLRB
officials as experts in this field. Bankruptcy courts should utilize this
pool of experts when the issue of labor contract rejection arises in the
reorganization context.
Labor arbitrators develop familiarity with the industrial setting by
resolving the disputes that arise during the life of a bargaining agree-
ment.134 They gain additional expertise by participating in negotiations
for new agreements.1 5 The expertise of labor arbitrators was lauded by
the Supreme Court in the Steelworkers Trilogy, which established arbi-
analogous to a narrowing of the gap between the interests of employees and employers
when a company is failing. That is, when liquidation becomes a possibility, unions and
debtors share the goal of preserving the business and the jobs it provides. The experi-
ence of Chrysler Corporation is a clear example. See Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1979, at 3,
col. 4; see also'Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1979, at 3, col. 1; Labor Settles for Less, NEws-
WEEK, May 10, 1982, at 68.
"" With regard to labor arbitrators, the Supreme Court stated: "[Tlhey sit to
settle disputes at the plant level-disputes that require for their solution knowledge of
the custom and practices of a particular factory or of a particular industry as reflected
in particular agreements." United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) (footnote omitted). Arbitrators are in high demand in
the labor field because over 95% of all collective bargaining agreements provide for
arbitration. See J. GETMAN & J. BLACKBURN, LABOR RELATIONS: LAW, PRACTICE
AND POLICY 356 (2d ed. 1983).
135 This aspect of labor arbitration is referred to as "interest arbitration." See R.
GORMAN, supra note 79, at 573.
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tration as preferable to court action for contract dispute resolution. 3
Professor Gregory has suggested that "[i]ncorporating the time-honored
wisdom of labor arbitrators into the bankruptcy court's difficult deci-
sion . . . is likely to make the ultimate decision far more palatable to
the parties. 1 3 7 And one court similarly noted that "the unique role and
special expertise of the arbitrator may be of invaluable assistance to the
bankruptcy judge and may serve to avoid unnecessary conflict between
labor union and debtor."1 8 Thus, labor arbitrators have highly re-
garded grass roots knowledge of the labor setting that bankruptcy
judges could tap when making decisions involving labor contracts.
Mediators are another group of specialists who are constantly in-
volved in labor dispute resolution. The Federal Mediation and Concili-
ation Service (FMCS)139 is an agency of professional mediators that
must be notified by parties who anticipate unilateral modifications or
terminations of collective bargaining agreements.140 The mediators then
monitor these situations and, when negotiations appear to be failing,
mediate between the parties in an attempt to resolve the labor dis-
pute. 41 Federal mediators enter labor disputes when relations are
poorest and thus become involved in "the most complex, sensitive, and
difficult of all labor negotiations." 42 Most mediators come to the
136 As the Supreme Court noted, "The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring
the same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance,
because he cahnot be similarly informed." United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960). In fact, even the NLRB defers to the
determinations of labor arbitrators. See, e.g., Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B.
837, 839 (1971); see generally R. GORMAN, supra note 79, at 477-80.
," Gregory, supra note 51, at 604 (footnote omitted). A similar argument was
made, proposing bankruptcy court use of labor arbitrators in Note, The Bankruptcy
Law's Effect on Collective Bargaining, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 408-09 (1981).
18 Bohack Corp. v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807, 431 F. Supp. 646, 653
(E.D.N.Y.) (finding that the bankruptcy court could order the parties to arbitrate their
disputes), affd per curiam, 567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825
(1978).
13' The FMCS was created in 1947 by section 202(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act,
Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 202(a), 61 Stat. 136, 153 (1947) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C § 172(a) (1982)), having been preceded by the U.S. Conciliation Service in the
Department of Labor, which was established in 1913. See A. ZACK, PUBLIC SECTOR
MEDIATION 3 (1985). Unlike arbitrators, mediators make suggestions and recommen-
dations to help parties resolve their own differences, but do not make decisions in any
adjudicatory fashion. See W. SIMKIN, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING 27-29 (1971).
140 Notification of the FMCS is required by § 8(d)(3) of the NLRA, which is
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(3) (1982).
141 See U.S. FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE 29TH ANNUAL
REPORT 26 (1976).
142 U.S. FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE 33RD ANNUAL RE-
PORT 4 (1980).
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FMCS after other experience in the industrial setting;14 3 they receive
intense training and are then sent into to the field for experience at the
bargaining table.114 Through constant observation and participation in
negotiation sessions, mediators gain a working knowledge of union and
management interests and industrial relations. 145 The FMCS, there-
fore, is well-suited for providing assistance to the bankruptcy courts
faced with the issue of labor contract rejection.
A final and perhaps more obvious source of labor expertise is the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Section 3 of the NLRA
gives the Board and its General Counsel the duty of enforcing the pro-
visions of the act.14 The officials who make up the Board and General
Counsel work with labor disputes and collective bargaining agreements
on a daily basis, and have developed an expertise that is praised and
deferred to by the courts."14 As one bankruptcy court noted: "Congress
endowed the NLRB with peculiar competence over labor matters be-
cause of its supposed expertise in this presumptively specialized
field."" 8'4 The Board thus has strong potential as a source of assistance
to bankruptcy courts making determinations involving collective bar-
gaining agreements and the industrial setting. 1
9
C. Method of Input
There are a variety of methods through which the aforementioned
sources could make information available to the bankruptcy courts. On
a formal level, experts could receive the necessary statistics and docu-
ments in order to brief and argue the rejection issue before the court
orally. A less rigid alternative would be for experts to monitor the ne-
gotiations, and to file a recommendation or report with the bankruptcy
court. Alternatively, a court might find it most beneficial simply to ob-
tain answers from a neutral party to specific questions regarding good
faith bargaining or good cause for refusing a proposal.
14 See Kolb, Roles Mediators Play: State and Federal Practice, 20 INDUS. REL.
1, 13 (1981).
144 See W. SIMKIN, supra note 139, at 69-71.
145 See A. ZACK, supra note 139, at 29.
148 See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1982).
147 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
148 In Re Amalgamated Foods, Inc., 41 Bankr. 616, 618 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984).
149 One commentator has suggested that the NLRB and bankruptcy court jointly
supervise cases involving labor contract rejection. See Legal Developments, supra note
110, at 624. Joint supervision would require a precise and difficult delineation of the
relative authorities of each tribunal. This Comment's proposal attempts, instead, to
work within the basic framework of the current Chapter 11 procedures, preserving the
complete authority of the bankruptcy court, while mandating only that it seek assis-
tance in making determinations that involve the specialized field of labor relations.
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Since the goal of providing input is to effectuate the underlying
policies of both the bankruptcy and labor laws by assisting the bank-
ruptcy judge, the method of input should cater to the interests and
needs of the particular judge involved. A bankruptcy judge must, there-
fore, be given the flexibility to choose that method which best suits her
individual need for information. That flexibility is best ensured by a
process that allows judges to consider the widest range of input alterna-
tives possible within the context of reorganization proceedings.
With respect to the input offered by the experts, the congressional
mandate that the bankruptcy forum exclude labor law precedent re-
mains applicable. 150 The experts must refrain from evaluating the be-
havior and proposals in terms of case law and definitions under the
NLRA. Their assistance should reflect their knowledge of labor rela-
tions, and not their knowledge of labor law. The role of the experts
must be to aid the court in understanding the meaning and significance
of actions that take place in a setting with which experts are intimately
familiar. It is their familiarity with the labor relations setting that must
be the source of their input.
It is unclear whether, under the existing law, bankruptcy courts
could take steps to obtain input from arbitrators, mediators, or officials
of the NLRB. Section 11 13(d)(1) provides that any "interested party"
may appear and be heard at the hearings on the rejection of collective
bargaining agreements.15 Courts have interpreted an analogous provi-
sion governing reorganization proceedings generally 152 to allow bank-
ruptcy courts considerable discretion in defining the phrase "interested
parties. '153 Nevertheless, it is questionable whether this provision could
be interpreted to provide the courts with the authority to appoint labor
experts to monitor negotiations. Congress, therefore, must make it clear
that the courts should take necessary actions to obtain input from
knowledgeable sources.'" In this way, the legislature would further a
policy requiring that labor issues be handled intelligently in the bank-
ruptcy courts.
150 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
5 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
1612 See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1982).
113 See, e.g., In Re Cash Currency Inc., 37 Bankr. 617, 628 n.10 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1984) ("A bankruptcy court has discretion to allow intervention in a Chapter 11
case by parties other than those specifically designated."); In Re Citizen's Loan and
Thrift Co., 7 Bankr. 88, 90 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1980) (finding that § 1109(b) does not
deprive the bankruptcy court of discretion in determining which parties may be heard).
164 The speed with which Congress acted in passing section 1113, see supra notes
53-64 and accompanying text, militates against the possibility that Congress has al-
ready considered this possibility.
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CONCLUSION
The rejection of collective bargaining agreements by a debtor in
Chapter 11 reorganization involves important issues under the bank-
ruptcy and labor laws. However, the law that currently governs such
rejection, section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, fails to account for the
fact that the bankruptcy courts that must deal with the issue lack the
experience and expertise to evaluate appropriately the labor issues that
unavoidably arise. Thus, Congress's attempt to provide special treat-
ment for labor contracts, which differ substantially from other execu-
tory contracts, will fail due to the bankruptcy courts' inability to deal
effectively with issues beyond their competence. The legislature and the
bankruptcy courts should remedy this difficulty by tapping the cur-
rently existing pool of labor experts. Labor arbitrators, mediators, or
officials of the NLRB should be called upon to provide the necessary
assistance to the bankruptcy courts. In this way the parallel policies of
business stability and industrial peace promoted by the bankruptcy and
labor laws will be served through an informed decision-making process.
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